Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Regulatory federalism in network industries

Contents:

Author Info

  • Francesc Trillas

    ()
    (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB)

Abstract

This article starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. Some new developments (which focus on the role of inter-jurisdictional externalities and multiple objectives) are then added and used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and specialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architecture of regulation expand.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ieb.ub.edu/aplicacio/fitxers/2009/3/Doc2008-8.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 No s'ha trobat el component (http://www.ieb.ub.edu/aplicacio/fitxers/2009/3/Doc2008-8.pdf) (http://ieb.ub.edu/aplicacio/fitxers/2009/3/Doc2008-8.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www.ieb.ub.edu/aplicacio/fitxers/2009/3/Doc2008-8.pdf). If this is indeed the case, please notify ()
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2008/8.

as in new window
Length: 75 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/3/doc2008-8

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Carrer del Tinent Coronel Valenzuela 1-11, 08034 Barcelona
Phone: 93 403 46 46
Fax: 93 403 98 32
Email:
Web page: http://www.ieb.ub.edu
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Regulation; federalism; network industries.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Paul Levine & John Stern & Francesc Trillas, 2005. "Utility price regulation and time inconsistency: comparisons with monetary policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 447-478, July.
  2. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2000. "The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 96, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Carl Blumstein & Lee Friedman & Richard Green, 2002. "The History of Electricity Restructuring in California," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 9-38, June.
  5. Agrell Per J. & Pouyet Jerome, 2008. "Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, March.
  6. Paula Sarmento & António Brandão, 2006. "Access Pricing: A Comparison Between Full Deregulation and Two Alternative Instruments of Access Price Regulation, Cost-Based and Retail-Minus," CEF.UP Working Papers, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto 0603, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  7. Joskow, P.L., 2004. "Transmission Policy in the United States," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 0454, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  8. Philip M. Parker & Lars-Hendrik Roller, 1997. "Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 304-322, Summer.
  9. Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Hierarchies and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics WP2005-034, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2005.
  10. Walter Distaso & Paolo Lupi & Fabio M. Manenti, 2005. "Platform Competition and Broadband Uptake: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the European Union," Industrial Organization, EconWPA 0504019, EconWPA.
  11. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-27, September.
  12. Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000. "Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Damien J. NEVEN & Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER, 1999. "The Allocation of Jurisdiction in International Antitrust," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 9916, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  14. Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
  15. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  16. Kwoka, J. & Pollitt, M., 2007. "Industry Restructuring, Mergers, And Efficiency: Evidence From Electric Power," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 0725, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  17. Antonio Estache & Sarbajit Sinha, 1995. "Does decentralization improve infrastructure performance?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44078, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  18. Andreas Haufler & Søren Bo Nielsen, 2008. "Merger policy to promote 'global players'? A simple model," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 517-545, July.
  19. Francesc Trillas, 2004. "The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, Fundación SEPI, vol. 28(2), pages 257-284, May.
  20. Joskow, Paul L, 1974. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 291-327, October.
  21. Caillaud, B. & Jullien, B. & Picard, P., 1996. "National vs European incentive policies: Bargaining, information and coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 91-111, January.
  22. Perry, Martin K, 1984. "Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition, and Public Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 313-33, March.
  23. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
  24. repec:rne:rneart:v:7:y:2008:i:1:p:111-135 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Raaj Kumar Sah, 1991. "Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
  26. Michal Moore, 2002. "The Issue of Governance and the Role of the Regulator: Lessons from the California Deregulation Experiment," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 75-90, June.
  27. Richard Green, 2007. "EU Regulation and Competition Policy among the Energy Utilities," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham 08-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  28. Richard J. Gilbert & Michael H. Riordan, 1995. "Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 243-256, Summer.
  29. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1983. "Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 23-50, April.
  30. Casella, Alessandra & Frey, Bruno, 1992. "Federalism and clubs : Towards an economic theory of overlapping political jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 639-646, April.
  31. Köhler, Matthias, 2008. "Transparency of Regulation and Cross-Border Bank Mergers," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 08-009, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  32. Jarrell, Gregg A, 1978. "The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 269-95, October.
  33. Priest, George L, 1993. "The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" Debate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 289-323, April.
  34. Mariano Tommasi & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2007. "Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal-Agent Analysis," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 369-389, 04.
  35. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "The Institutions of Regulation," Working Papers, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia 67, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2004.
  36. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 43-64, Fall.
  37. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
  38. Cécile Aubert & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Pablo Serra & Diego Bondorevsky & Diego Petrecolla & Alfredo García & Paulina Beato & David Wood & Richard Tomiak & Jaime Millán & Carmen Fuente & Salomé Cis, . "Competition Policy in Regulated Industries: Approaches for Emerging Economies," IDB Publications 42038, Inter-American Development Bank.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mörk, Eva & Sjögren, Anna & Svaleryd, Helena, 2009. "Cheaper Child Care, More Children," IZA Discussion Papers 3942, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Boggio, Margherita, 2011. "Municipal capitalism, regulatory federalism and politics," MPRA Paper 46244, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Montolio, Daniel & Trillas, Francesc, 2013. "Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 18-31.
  4. Albert Sole-Olle & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2009. "The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets: Does Spain Behave differently?," Working Papers in Economics, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia 226, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  5. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Delegation to Independent Regulators and the Ratchet Effect," School of Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Surrey 0911, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/3/doc2008-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.