This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Regulatory federalism in network industries

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Francesc Trillas () (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB)
Abstract

This article starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. Some new developments (which focus on the role of inter-jurisdictional externalities and multiple objectives) are then added and used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and specialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architecture of regulation expand.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://eventosempresariales.com/aplicacio/fitxers/2009/3/Doc2008-8.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2008/8.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 75 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/3/doc2008-8

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Carrer del Tinent Coronel Valenzuela 1-11, 08034 Barcelona
Phone: 93 403 46 46
Fax: 93 403 98 32
Email:
Web page: http://www.ieb.ub.edu
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Regulation; federalism; network industries.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Joskow, Paul L, 1974. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 291-327, October.
    Other versions:
  3. Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
    Other versions:
  4. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-27, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004. "The subsidiarity bias in regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 255-283, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Richard Green, 2007. "EU Regulation and Competition Policy among the Energy Utilities," Discussion Papers 08-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
  8. Priest, George L, 1993. "The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" Debate," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 289-323, April.
  9. Sah, R.K., 1991. "Fallibility In Human Organizations And Political Systems," Papers 625, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
    Other versions:
  10. Richard J. Gilbert & Michael H. Riordan, 1995. "Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 243-256, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1983. "Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 23-50, April.
  13. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    Other versions:
  14. Joskow, Paul L., 2005. "Transmission policy in the United States," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 95-115, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Robert Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1140, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Inman, Robert P & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 43-64, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Per J. Agrell & Jerome Pouyet, 2008. "Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 7(1), pages 111-135, March. [Downloadable!]
  18. Perry, Martin K, 1984. "Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition, and Public Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 313-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Distaso, Walter & Lupi, Paolo & Manenti, Fabio M., 2006. "Platform competition and broadband uptake: Theory and empirical evidence from the European union," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 87-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Jarrell, Gregg A, 1978. "The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 269-95, October.
  23. Francesc Trillas, 2004. "The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 28(2), pages 257-284, May. [Downloadable!]
  24. Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2000. "The allocation of jurisdiction in international antitrust," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 845-855, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was sponsored from 1997 to 2002 by the Université du Québec à Montréal.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.