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From Reluctant Privatization to Municipal Capitalism: an Overview on Ownership, Political Connections and Decentralization

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  • Boggio, Margherita
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    Abstract

    Starting from a few considerations on the phenomenon of municipal capitalism, a trait which characterizes many local governments in Italy and Europe, this paper presents a selective survey of some important topics in regulation. The most relevant contributions on privatization, political connections and accountability are included, together with lessons on decentralization, to show how these elements can be applied in unison to deal with the issues presented in this paper.

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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46232/
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 46232.

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    Date of creation: 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46232

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    Keywords: regulation; decentralization; reluctant privatization; municipal capitalism.;

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