Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up?
AbstractWe study the degree of corruption in a hierarchical model of government. In particular, we explore the question of whether adding a layer of government simply increases the total amount of corruption or generates an organizational efficiency (via a principal-agent relationship between levels of government) that reduces the total amount of corruption.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie in its series Papers with number 1999-12.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.
CORRUPTION ; SOCIETY ; ECONOMIC MODELS ; GOVERNMENT;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- C. Simon Fan & Chen Lin & Daniel Treisman, 2010. "Embezzlement Versus Bribery," NBER Working Papers 16542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emerson, Patrick M., 2006. "Corruption, competition and democracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 193-212, October.
- John Bennett & Saul Estrin, 2006.
"Corruption and Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economy,"
Economics and Finance Discussion Papers
06-07, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- Bennett, John & Estrin, Saul, 2006. "Corruption and Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economy," IZA Discussion Papers 2156, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- JOhn Bennett & Saul Estrin, 2006. "Corruption and Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economy," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 825, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Boggio, Margherita, 2011. "From Reluctant Privatization to Municipal Capitalism: an Overview on Ownership, Political Connections and Decentralization," MPRA Paper 46232, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shah, Anwar, 2006. "Corruption and decentralized public governance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3824, The World Bank.
- Balafoutas, Loukas, 2011.
"Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 51-59.
- Balafoutas, Loukas, 2011. "Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 51-59, April.
- Loukas Balafoutas, 2009. "Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game," Working Papers 2009-01, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Shuanglin Lin & Wei Zhang, 2009. "The effect of corruption on capital accumulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(1), pages 67-93, May.
- Daniel Kaufmann & Gil Mehrez & Tugrul Gurgur, 2003. "Voice or Public Sector Management? An Empirical Investigation of Determinants of Public Sector Performance based on a Survey of Public Officials," Econometrics 0308004, EconWPA.
- Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Tim Mennel, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization and Pollution: Institutions Matter," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201222, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Ekaterina VOSTROKNUTOVA, 2003.
"Shadow Economy, Rent-Seeking Activities and the Perils of Reinforcement of the Rule of Law,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2003/09, European University Institute.
- Ekaterina Vostroknutova, 2003. "Shadow Economy, Rent-Seeking Activities and the Perils of Reinforcement of the Rule of Law," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-578, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability and Low-Productivity Traps," Working Papers w0029, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Richard Bernardi & Michael Witek & Michael Melton, 2009. "A Four-Country Study of the Associations Between Bribery and Unethical Actions," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 84(3), pages 389-403, February.
- Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability, Elections, and Government Support of Business Activity," Working Papers w0030, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.