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Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up?

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Author Info
Waller, C.J.
Verdier, T.
Gardner, R.

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Abstract

We study the degree of corruption in a hierarchical model of government. In particular, we explore the question of whether adding a layer of government simply increases the total amount of corruption or generates an organizational efficiency (via a principal-agent relationship between levels of government) that reduces the total amount of corruption.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie in its series Papers with number 1999-12.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:lavale:1999-12

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.

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Related research
Keywords: CORRUPTION ; SOCIETY ; ECONOMIC MODELS ; GOVERNMENT;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Cited by:
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  1. Shuanglin Lin & Wei Zhang, 2009. "The effect of corruption on capital accumulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(1), pages 67-93, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Shah, Anwar, 2006. "Corruption and decentralized public governance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3824, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability, Elections, and Government Support of Business Activity," Working Papers w0030, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  4. John Bennett & Saul Estrin, 2006. "Corruption and Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economy," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 06-07, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Richard Bernardi & Michael Witek & Michael Melton, 2009. "A Four-Country Study of the Associations Between Bribery and Unethical Actions," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 84(3), pages 389-403, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ekaterina Vostroknutova, 2003. "Shadow Economy, Rent-Seeking Activities and the Perils of Reinforcement of the Rule of Law," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-578, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability and Low-Productivity Traps," Working Papers w0029, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  8. Daniel Kaufmann & Gil Mehrez & Tugrul Gurgur, 2003. "Voice or Public Sector Management? An Empirical Investigation of Determinants of Public Sector Performance based on a Survey of Public Officials," Econometrics 0308004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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