Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications
AbstractWe analyse the impact of regulation, industrial policy and jurisdictional allocation on broadband deployment using a theoretical model and an empirical estimation. Although central powers may be more focused and internalize interjurisdictional externalities, decentralized powers may internalize local horizontal policy spillovers and use a diversity of objectives as a commitment device in the presence of sunk investments. The latter may, for instance, alleviate the collective action problem of the joint use of rights of way and other physical infrastructures. In the empirical exercise, using data for OECD and EU countries for the period 1999-2006, we examine whether centralization promotes new telecommunications markets, in particular the broadband access market. The existing literature, in the main, claims it does, but we find no support for this claim in our data. Our results show that indicators of national industrial policy are a weakly positive determinant of broadband deployment and that different measures of centralization are either irrelevant or have a negative impact on broadband penetration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2011/15.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Regulation; industrial policy; decentralization; broadband;
Other versions of this item:
- Montolio, Daniel & Trillas, Francesc, 2013. "Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 18-31.
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-HME-2011-09-05 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-IND-2011-09-05 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2011-09-05 (Regulation)
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