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Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis

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Author Info
Richard J. Gilbert
Michael H. Riordan

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Abstract

Optimal regulation, subject to informational constraints, is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs. An issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be "bundled" or "unbundled." Bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry. Unbundled supply has each component regulated separately. A main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to "double marginalization" in the monopoly pricing of complementary products. Unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services, but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 26 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 243-256
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:summer:p:243-256

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  1. Pablo T. Spiller, 2008. "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications," NBER Working Papers 14152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Alexander Galetovic, 2003. "Integración Vertical en el Sector Eléctrico: Una guía para el usuario (Vertical integration in the electricity sector)," Documentos de Trabajo 158, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  4. Doh Shin Jeon, . "Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation," Economics Working Papers 623, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  5. In-Uck Park & Chongwoo Choe, 2004. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 14, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Regulatory federalism in network industries," Working Papers 2008/8, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB). [Downloadable!]
  7. Leopold Soegner, 1998. "Regulation of a Complementary Imputed Good in a Competitive Environment," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp056, Vienna University of Economics and B.A., Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2009. "On The (Sub) Optimality Of Multi-Tier Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Motivation," Monash Economics Working Papers 18/08, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2006. "'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 5610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2008. "Information Gathering, Delegated Contracting And Corporate Hierarchies," Monash Economics Working Papers 19/08, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics," MPRA Paper 6989, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Dequiedt, Vianney & Martimort, David, 2004. "Delegated Monitoring versus Arm's Length Contracting," IDEI Working Papers 265, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Mohammad Arzaghi & Ernst R. Berndt & James C. Davis & Alvin J. Silk, 2008. "Economic Factors Underlying the Unbundling of Advertising Agency Services," NBER Working Papers 14345, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. King, S.P., 2000. "Does Structure Dominate Regulation? The Case of an Input Monopolist," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 767, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  17. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2001. "Screening Through Bundling," Penn CARESS Working Papers 3b8e0b3847b08b90e8570987c, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  18. repec:att:wimass:19199821 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Semenov, Aggey & Martimort, David, 2004. "Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying," MPRA Paper 8519, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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