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Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games

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  • Maria Montero

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Abstract

This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount factor increases, and if players are perfectly patient altruism and spite become irrelevant for material payoffs.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-007-9087-6
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 65 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 125-151

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:2:p:125-151

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

Related research

Keywords: altruism; spite; bargaining; competition; coalition formation;

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References

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  1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA.
  2. Maria Montero, 2006. "Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity," Working Papers 2006.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Norman,P., 2000. "Legislative bargaining and coalition formation," Working papers 12, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  4. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  5. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
  6. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
  7. Maria Montero, 2005. "Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity in Majoritarian Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0505007, EconWPA.
  8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:43:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Bester, H. & Güth, W., 1994. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?," Discussion Paper 1994-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  11. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  12. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  13. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  14. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. " The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-54, June.
  15. Possajennikov, Alex, 2001. "Equilibrium selection in a merger game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 255-261, August.
  16. Possajennikov, Alex, 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 125-129, May.
  17. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April.
  18. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kohler, Stefan, 2013. "Inequality aversion causes equal or unequal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40764, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Kohler, Stefan, 2012. "Guilt causes equal or unequal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40760, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Kohler, Stefan, 2012. "Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40761, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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