Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity in Majoritarian Bargaining
AbstractInequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division inside the coalition that forms in majoritarian bargaining games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0505007.
Length: 4 pages
Date of creation: 20 May 2005
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noncooperative bargaining; majority games; inequity aversion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-23 (All new papers)
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- Maria Montero, 2005.
"Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games,"
Game Theory and Information
- Maria Montero, 2008. "Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 125-151, September.
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