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Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity in Majoritarian Bargaining

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Author Info
Maria Montero (University of Nottingham)

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Abstract

Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division inside the coalition that forms in majoritarian bargaining games.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0505/0505007.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0505007.

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Length: 4 pages
Date of creation: 20 May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0505007

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 4
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: noncooperative bargaining; majority games; inequity aversion;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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  1. Maria Montero, 2005. "Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games," Game Theory and Information 0512004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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