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Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Maria Montero (University of Nottingham)
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Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required. This is due to the analogy between inequity aversion and risk aversion. Inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics: the advantage of being proposer can decrease as players become more impatient.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2006.80.
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Date of creation: May 2006Date of revision:
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Keywords: Noncooperative Bargaining ; Coalition Formation ; Inequity Aversion ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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Maria Montero, 2008.
"Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games ,"
Theory and Decision ,
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Other versions: John Duffy & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2009.
"Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games ,"
Working Papers
383, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2009.
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