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A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy

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  • Jean-Robert Tyran

    ()

  • Rupert Sausgruber

    ()

Abstract

We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment, and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 with number 2002-30.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2002:2002-30

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Keywords: Fairness; Voting; Redistribution;

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