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Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining

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Author Info
Antonio Merlo (Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 271 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA)
Charles Wilson (Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA)

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Abstract

We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of random size) and the players share a common discount factor, we establish the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect payoff which is efficient and characterize the conditions under which agreement is delayed. We also investigate how the equilibrium payoffs depend on the order in which the players move and on the correlation between the identity of the proposer and the cake size.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 11 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 39-55
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:11:y:1997:i:1:p:39-55

Note: Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: December 31, 1996
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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  3. Harold Houba, . "Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-063/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Taiji Furusawa & Quan Wen, 2001. "Unique Inneficient Perfect Equilibrium in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining with Complete Information," Working Papers 0121, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities," Research Memoranda 044, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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