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  • Susan Vroman

    (Georgetown University)

  • Axel Anderson

    (Georgetown University)

  • James Albrecht

    (Georgetown University)

Abstract

This result would seem to imply that the more members on a committee the lower the average search duration. It turns out that this does not immediately follow, and in fact, the average search duration may increase as the committee grows in size. Thus, we cannot simply compare thresholds to determine the average search duration. Nevertheless we prove the following results about search durations holding the plurality rule constant: 1. the average search duration may rise or fall in committee size and 2. the average search duration is declining in committee size once the committee gets over a certain threshold size. In addition to such comparative statics, we consider the effect on average welfare of committee size and the vote aggregation rule.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2007 Meeting Papers with number 351.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed007:351

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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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References

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  1. Bagnoli, M. & Bergstrom, T., 1989. "Log-Concave Probability And Its Applications," Papers 89-23, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  2. Burdett, Kenneth, 1996. "Truncated means and variances," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 263-267, September.
  3. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 347-68, September.
  4. McCall, John J, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 113-26, February.
  5. Alexander Shapiro & Jos Berge, 2002. "Statistical inference of minimum rank factor analysis," Psychometrika, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 79-94, March.
  6. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
  7. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  8. Vroman, S B, 1985. "No-Help-Wanted Signs and the Duration of Job Search," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(379), pages 767-73, September.
  9. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey: Part I," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(2), pages 155-89, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bulent Guler & Fatih Guvenen & Giovanni L. Violante, 2009. "Joint-search theory: new opportunities and new frictions," Staff Report 426, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Luca Flabbi and James Mabli, 2012. "Household Search or Individual Search: Does It Matter? Evidence from Lifetime Inequality Estimates," Working Papers gueconwpa~12-12-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Bruno Strulovici, 2008. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Economics Series Working Papers 2008-WO8, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2011. "Efficient Search by Committee," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000020, David K. Levine.
  5. Yoichi Hizen & Keisuke Kawata & Masaru Sasaki, 2011. "An Experimental Test of a Committee Search Model," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-06-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Sep 2012.
  6. Shi, Xianwen & Moldovanu, Benny, 2013. "Specialization and partisanship in committee search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
  7. Moscarini, Giuseppe & Wright, Randall, 2010. "Introduction to Search Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1319-1324, July.

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