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The option to wait in collective decisions

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  • Mattias K. Polborn

    (Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

  • Matthias Messner

    (Bocconi Univ., Milan)

Abstract

We also explore the robustness of our model when second period valuations are correlated across individuals, and when each individual's first and second period types are correlated.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2008 Meeting Papers with number 397.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:397

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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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  1. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 38-67, 03.
  2. Hulya Eraslan & Philip Bond, 2007. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals," 2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 167, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Guttman, Joel M., 1998. "Unanimity and majority rule: the calculus of consent reconsidered," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 189-207, May.
  4. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 07-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 02 Jan 2007.
  5. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2004. "Voting on Majority Rules," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 115-132, 01.
  6. Tullock, Gordon, 1998. "Reply to Guttman," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 215-218, May.
  7. Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December.
  8. Glazer, Amihai, 1989. "Politics and the Choice of Durability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1207-13, December.
  9. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 933-971, 05.

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