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Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals

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  • Hulya Eraslan

    (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Philip Bond

    (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

Prior research on “strategic voting” has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off. Moreover, in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposing individual better off, even when he has diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2007 Meeting Papers with number 167.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed007:167

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References

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  22. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590459 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2008. "The Option to Wait in Collective Decisions," Working Papers 338, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  2. Henry, Emeric, 2008. "The informational role of supermajorities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2225-2239, October.
  3. Gratton, Gabriele, 2014. "Pandering and electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
  4. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura & A. Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136800, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013. "Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79967, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  6. Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013. "Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-202, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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