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Majority vote following a debate

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Author Info
Itzhak Gilboa ()
Nicolas Vieille ()

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Abstract

Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (08)
Pages: 115-125
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:1:p:115-125

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. A. Rubinstein & J. Glazer, . "Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s7, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    Other versions:
  2. Gilboa, I. & Schmeidler, D., 1999. "Inductive Inference: an Axiomatic Approach," Papers 29-99, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. VIEILLE, Nicolas, 2002. "Random walks and voting theory," Les Cahiers de Recherche 753, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information," THEMA Working Papers 2006-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-5.

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