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Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union

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Author Info
HANS GERSBACH
VOLKER HAHN

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Abstract

We examine whether the monetary policy committee of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare. This finding also holds for arbitrary levels of private benefits from holding office and if governments incur costs when replacing committee members. High private benefits of committee members always lower overall welfare, as they induce nonpartisan members to care more about being reappointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. Nonrenewable but long terms for national committee members and delegating the appointment of all committee members to a union-wide authority would be desirable. Copyright (c) 2009 The Ohio State University.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00235.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 41 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (08)
Pages: 831-853
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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:41:y:2009:i:5:p:831-853

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Waller, Christopher J & Walsh, Carl E, 1996. "Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1139-53, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hahn, Volker & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Heinemann, Friedrich & Huefner, Felix P., 2002. "Is the View from the Eurotower Purely European? : National Divergence and ECB Interest Rate Policy," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-69, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  6. Sibert, Anne, 1999. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2004. "Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests, And The Appointment Of Central Bankers," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16, pages 321-345, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Christopher J. Waller, 2000. "Policy Boards And Policy Smoothing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 305-339, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Petra Geraats, 2007. "Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ellen Meade, 2006. "Dissent and Disagreement on the Fed's FOMC: Understanding Regional Affiliations and limits to Transparency," DNB Working Papers 094, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cukierman, Alex, 2007. "The Limits of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 6475, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Geraats, P.M, 2005. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0549, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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