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How Transparent are Central Banks? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Eijffinger, Sylvester C W
Geraats, Petra M
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Central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and academic debate on monetary policy. Unfortunately, it has been complicated by the fact that transparency is a qualitative concept that is hard to measure. This Paper proposes a comprehensive index for central bank transparency that comprises the political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of central banking. The index is compiled for nine major central banks. It is based on an analysis of information disclosure practices and reveals a rich variety in the degree of central bank transparency.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
3188.
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Date of creation: Feb 2002Date of revision:
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Keywords: accountability central banking independence monetary policy transparency Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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