Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Central Bank Secrecy, Interest Rates, and Monetary Control

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cosimano, Thomas F
  • Van Huyck, John B

Abstract

The authors construct a dynamic rational expectations model of the federal funds and deposit market that provides a rationale for central bank secrecy about current monetary aggregate objectives. In this analysis, the Trading Desk values secrecy because it reduces the influence of monetary control policy on interest rates. The authors then examine actual U.S. experience with monetary control and determine that the reserve bias predicted by the model is present in the data from 1978 to 1985. Finally, they demonstrate that central bank secrecy may not lower the value of commercial banks. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 31 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 370-82

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:31:y:1993:i:3:p:370-82

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Phone: 714-965-8800
Fax: 01865 267 985
Email:
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mariusz Jarmuzek & Lucjan T. Orlowski & Artur Radziwill, 2004. "Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0281, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  2. Joseph H. Haslag, 2001. "On Fed watching and central bank transparency in an overlapping generations model," Working Papers 0002, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  3. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
  4. Dia, Enzo, 2013. "How do banks respond to shocks? A dynamic model of deposit-taking institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3623-3638.
  5. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Mariusz Jarmuzek & Lucjan T. Orlowski & Artur Radziwill, 2005. "Monetary Policy Transparency in the Inflation Targeting," Macroeconomics 0502025, EconWPA.
  7. Seth B. Carpenter, 2004. "Transparency and monetary policy: what does the academic literature tell policymakers?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:31:y:1993:i:3:p:370-82. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.