On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency
AbstractWe examine to what extent central banks should release their internal assessments concerning the links between money growth and future inflation, and between employment and inflation. We show that the social value of knowledge transparency concerning real shocks is negative since the disclosure of the central bank's private information eliminates the possibility of insuring the public against those shocks. Finally, we discuss a number of further arguments which have to be taken into account before policy conclusions can be drawn. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.
Volume (Year): 4 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (08)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm
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