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Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences

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  • Giuseppe Ciccarone

    ()

  • Enrico Marchetti

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-010-9701-y
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 150 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 263-282

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:150:y:2012:i:1:p:263-282

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords: Central bank; Common agency; Monetary policy; Transparency;

References

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Cited by:
  1. Bennani, Hamza, 2014. "Does one word fit all? The asymmetric effects of central banks' communication policy," MPRA Paper 57150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire Armstrong, 2013. "Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 320-338, June.

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