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Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates

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  • Guido Tabellini

    (UCLA)

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of how secrecy of the short-run monetary policy objectives affects the behavior of the federal-funds rate. Secrecy is modeled by assuming that financial markets are unc ertain about a parameter in the Federal Reserve reaction function. Th ey learn over time about this parameter, by means of Bayes rule, and this learning process is reflected in the time path of interest rates and of reserve aggregates. The main result of the paper is that secr ecy tends to increase the volatility of the funds rate and of reserve aggregates. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp426.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 426.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 1986
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:426

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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References

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  1. McCallum, Bennett T., 1983. "On non-uniqueness in rational expectations models : An attempt at perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 139-168.
  2. Marvin Goodfriend, 1986. "A weekly rational expectations model of the nonborrowed reserve operating procedure," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Jan, pages 11-28.
  3. Nichols, Donald A & Small, David H & Webster, Charles E, Jr, 1983. "Why Interest Rates Rise When an Unexpectedly Large Money Stock Is Announced," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 383-88, June.
  4. Roley, V Vance & Walsh, Carl E, 1985. "Monetary Policy Regimes, Expected Inflation, and the Response of Interest Rates to Money Announcements," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 1011-39, Supp..
  5. Marvin Goodfriend & Gary Anderson & Anil Kashyap & George Moore & Richard D. Porter, 1984. "A weekly perfect foresight model of the nonborrowed reserve operating procedure," Working Paper 84-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  6. LeRoy, Stephen F & Porter, Richard D, 1981. "The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 555-74, May.
  7. Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Learning and the volatility of exchange rates," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 243-250, June.
  8. Michael Dotsey, 1985. "Monetary policy, secrecy, and federal funds rate behavior," Working Paper 85-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  9. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1974. "Rational Expectations and Bayesian Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 521-36, May/June.
  10. Shiller, Robert J, 1979. "The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1190-1219, December.
  11. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Muller, P. & M. Zelmer, 1999. "Greater Transparency in Monetary Policy: Impact on Financial Markets," Technical Reports 86, Bank of Canada.
  2. Nathan Balke & Joseph H. Haslag, 1989. "Asymmetric information and the role of FED watching," Research Paper 8903, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  3. Aleksandar Murdzhev & Marc Tomljanovich, 2006. "What Color is Alan Greenspan's Tie? How Central Bank Policy Announcements Have Changed Financial Markets," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 571-593, Fall.
  4. Andrew G Haldane, 1997. "Designing Inflation Targets," RBA Annual Conference Volume, in: Philip Lowe (ed.), Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting Reserve Bank of Australia.
  5. Mariusz Jarmuzek & Lucjan T. Orlowski & Artur Radziwill, 2004. "Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0281, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  6. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
  7. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P., 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88701, Tilburg University.
  8. Joseph H. Haslag, 2001. "On Fed watching and central bank transparency in an overlapping generations model," Working Papers 0002, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  9. TUYSUZ, Sukriye, 2007. "Central Bank transparency and the U.S. interest rates level and volatility response to U.S. news," MPRA Paper 5217, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Andrew G Haldane & Vicky Read, 2000. "Monetary policy surprises and the yield curve," Bank of England working papers 106, Bank of England.
  11. Amir Kia & Hilde Patron, 2004. "Market-Based Monetary Policy Transparency Index, Risk and Volatility - The Case of the United States," Carleton Economic Papers 04-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  12. Amir Kia, 2005. "Developing a Market-Based Monetary Policy Transparency Index and Testing Its Impact on Risk and Volatility in the United States," Carleton Economic Papers 05-02, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  13. Matthew Rafferty & Marc Tomljanovich, 2002. "Central bank transparency and market efficiency: An econometric analysis," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 150-161, June.
  14. Cruijsen, C.A.B. van der & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. C.J.M. Kool & S. Rosenkranz & M. Middeldorp, 2007. "Listening without understanding: Central Bank transparency, financial markets and the crowding out of private information," Working Papers 07-19, Utrecht School of Economics.
  16. Vitale, P., 1997. "Speculative Noise Trading and Manipulation in the Foreign Exchange Market," Economics Working Papers eco97/23, European University Institute.
  17. Vitale, Paolo, 1999. "Sterilised central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 245-267, December.
  18. Lee, Jim, 2002. "Federal funds rate target changes and interest rate volatility," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-191.

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