This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Central Bank Forecasts and Disclosure Policy: Why it Pays to be Optimistic

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Eijffinger, Sylvester C W
Tesfaselassie, Mewael F.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In a simple macromodel with forward-looking expectations, this Paper looks into disclosure policy when a central bank has private information on future shocks. The main result is that advance disclosure of forecasts of future shocks does not improve welfare, and in some cases is not desirable as it impairs stabilization of current inflation and/or output. This result holds when there is no credibility problem or the central bank’s preference is common knowledge. When there is uncertainty about the central bank’s preference shock, and this uncertainty is not resolved in the subsequent period, advance disclosure does not matter for current outcomes. The reason lies in the strong dependence of one-period-ahead private sector inflation forecasts on central bank actions, which induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price stability in subsequent periods. Another implication of the model is that, in contrast to forecasts of current period shocks emphasized by the literature, forecasts of future shocks may not be revealed to the public by current policy choices because the central bank refrains from responding to its own forecasts.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4854.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4854.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4854

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: central bank disclosure; central bank forecasts; central bank transparency; forward-looking expectations; private information;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Determination of Interest Rates; Term Structure of Interest Rates
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M, 2003. "Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," CEPR Discussion Papers 4111, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2000. "Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 429-457, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Petra M. Geraats & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinnger & Carin A.B. van der Cruijsen, 2006. "Does Central Bank Transparency Reduce Interest Rates?," DNB Working Papers 085, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2004. "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?," NBER Working Papers 10829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Robert E. Hall & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1994. "Nominal Income Targeting," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy, pages 71-94 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1997. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," NBER Working Papers 5797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Robert G. King, 2000. "The new IS-LM model : language, logic, and limits," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 45-103. [Downloadable!]
  10. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P.M., 2004. "How Transparent Are Central Banks?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0411, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608.
  12. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
    Other versions:
  13. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, 2004. "Timeless perspective vs. discretionary monetary policy in forward-looking models," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 43-56. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Cukierman, A., 2000. "Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem," Papers 2000-4, Tel Aviv.
  15. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, . "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Geraats, Petra M, 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," CEPR Discussion Papers 2582, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Mewael F. Tesfaselassie, 2007. "Shifts in the Inflation Target and Communication of Central Bank Forecasts," Kiel Working Papers 1319, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Meixing DAI & Eleftherios SPYROMITROS, 2007. "Walsh’s Contract and Transparency about Central Bank Preferences for Robust Control," Working Papers of BETA 2007-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.