Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Transparency: can central banks commit to truthful communication?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Julian A. Parra-Polania

    ()

Abstract

To evaluate whether transparency is beneficial, it is usual to assume that the central bank may choose one of two options, opacity versus truthful communication. However, the monetary policymaker may have incentives to misrepresent private information so as to reduce economic volatility by manipulating inflation expectations. Using a standard model, this paper points out the fact that if misrepresentation is included as a possible action there is no rational expectations equilibrium with inflation announcements. Therefore, even if transparency is preferred over secrecy the central bank cannot credibly commit to truth-telling, in contrast to what is commonly assumed in the literature on transparency

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/be_711.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA in its series BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA with number 009614.

as in new window
Length: 26
Date of creation: 28 May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:col:000094:009614

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords: Central Bank Announcements; Monetary Policy; Transparency.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Sebastián Gómez Barrero & Julián Parra Polanía, 2011. "Comportamiento estratégico de los bancos centrales al anunciar pronósticos de inflación," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 008577, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  2. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy With Private Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 593, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Geraats, P.M., 2005. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0543, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  4. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Tesfaselassie, Mewael F., 2007. "Central Bank forecasts and disclosure policy: Why it pays to be optimistic," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 30-50, March.
  5. Geraats, P.M., 2004. "Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0473, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  6. Jensen, Henrik, 2002. " Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(3), pages 399-422, September.
  7. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  9. Geraats, Petra M, 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," CEPR Discussion Papers 2582, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  11. Maria Demertzis & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2004. "Central bank transparency in theory and practice," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 23, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  12. Carboni, Giacomo & Ellison, Martin, 2009. "Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information," Working Paper Series 1092, European Central Bank.
  13. Hoerova, Marie & Monnet, Cyril & Temzelides, Ted, 2009. "Money talks," Working Paper Series 1091, European Central Bank.
    • Marie Hoerova & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2009. "Money talks," Working Papers 09-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  14. Hans Gersbach, 2003. "On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 91-102, 08.
  15. Mahadeva, Lavan & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Inflation Targets as a Stabilisation Device," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 134, Royal Economic Society.
  16. Carl E. Walsh, 2007. "Optimal Economic Transparency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 5-36, March.
  17. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2006. "Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 448-452, March.
  19. Laskar, Daniel, 2010. "Central bank transparency and shocks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 158-160, May.
  20. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March.
  21. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2009. "Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates," NBER Working Papers 14791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Walsh, Carl E, 1999. "Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(262), pages 255-69, May.
  23. Tarkka, Juha & Mayes, David, 1999. "The Value of Publishing Official Central Bank Forecasts," Research Discussion Papers 22/1999, Bank of Finland.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000094:009614. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Norma Judith Paternina).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.