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Central Bank forecasts and disclosure policy: Why it pays to be optimistic

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  • Eijffinger, Sylvester
  • Tesfaselassie, Mewael F.

Abstract

In a simple macromodel with forward-looking expectations, this Paper looks into disclosure policy when a central bank has private information on future shocks. The main result is that advance disclosure of forecasts of future shocks does not improve welfare, and in some cases is not desirable as it impairs stabilization of current inflation and/or output. This result holds when there is no credibility problem or the central bank’s preference is common knowledge. When there is uncertainty about the central bank’s preference shock, and this uncertainty is not resolved in the subsequent period, advance disclosure does not matter for current outcomes. The reason lies in the strong dependence of one-period-ahead private sector inflation forecasts on central bank actions, which induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price stability in subsequent periods. Another implication of the model is that, in contrast to forecasts of current period shocks emphasized by the literature, forecasts of future shocks may not be revealed to the public by current policy choices because the central bank refrains from responding to its own forecasts.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 23 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 30-50

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:1:p:30-50

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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  1. Hans Gersbach, 2003. "On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 91-102, 08.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Meixing Dai & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2010. "Accountability And Transparency About Central Bank Preferences For Model Robustness," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(2), pages 212-237, 05.
  2. Wojciech Charemza & Daniel Ladley, 2012. "MPC Voting, Forecasting and Inflation," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/23, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2013.
  3. Rhee, Hyuk-jae & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2010. "Aggregate shock and monetary policy regimes," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 201-217, March.
  4. Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2012. "Transparency: can central banks commit to truthful communication?," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 009614, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  5. Rhee, Hyuk Jae & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2013. "Central bank transparency: Does it matter?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 183-197.
  6. James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2010. "Macroeconomic shocks, unionized labour markets and central bank disclosure policy: How beneficial is increased transparency?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 506-516, December.
  7. Katerina Arnostova & Jozef Barunik & Jan Filacek & Michal Franta & David Havrlant & Roman Horvath & Filip Novotny & Marie Rakova & Lubos Ruzicka & Branislav Saxa & Katerina Smidkova & Peter Toth, 2012. "Macroeconomic Forecasting: Methods, Accuracy and Coordination," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, Research Department, edition 1, volume 10, number rb10/1 edited by Jan Babecky, August.
  8. Meixing DAI & Eleftherios SPYROMITROS, 2007. "Walsh’s Contract and Transparency about Central Bank Preferences for Robust Control," Working Papers of BETA 2007-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  9. Mewael F. Tesfaselassie, 2007. "Shifts in the Inflation Target and Communication of Central Bank Forecasts," Kiel Working Papers 1319, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  10. Meixing Dai, 2012. "Static and Dynamic Effects of Central Bank Transparency," Working Papers of BETA 2012-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  11. Jan Filáček & Branislav Saxa, 2012. "Central Bank Forecasts as a Coordination Device: Evidence from the Czech Republic," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 244-264, October.

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