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Dissent and Disagreement on the Fed's FOMC: Understanding Regional Affiliations and limits to Transparency

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Author Info
Ellen Meade
Abstract

This paper addresses two important, but distinct, issues in monetary policy. The first issue concerns regional influences on voting within a monetary policy committee. In a committee that includes representatives from different regions or countries, is there a regional element to the monetary policy decision or to the votes cast by monetary policymakers? The second issue concerns possible limits to transparency. In an independent central bank that strives to be accountable and to communicate its policy effectively, are there circumstances under which increasing transparency could be harmful? The answer to both of these questions with respect to the Federal Reserve is "maybe".

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Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 094.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:094

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Related research
Keywords: central banking Federal Reserve FOMC voting

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Regional economic conditions and the FOMC votes of district presidents," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 3-16.
  2. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-12.
  3. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2005. "Communication and decision-making by central bank committees - different strategies, same effectiveness?," Working Paper Series 488, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1992. " Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 397-417, June.
  5. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Geraats, Petra M, 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2001. "Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  10. Alan S. Blinder & Ricardo Reis, 2005. "Understanding the Greenspan Standard," Working Papers 88, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2005. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 5155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Gildea, John A, 1992. "The Regional Representation of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(2), pages 215-25, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John, 1995. "The Biases of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 274-84, April.
  14. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Ellen E. Meade, 2005. "The FOMC: preferences, voting, and consensus," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 93-101. [Downloadable!]
  16. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christopher W. Crowe, 2007. "Testing the Transparency Benefits of Inflation Targeting: Evidence from Private Sector Forecasts," IMF Working Papers 06/289, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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