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Central Bank boards around the world: why does membership size differ?

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  • Berger, Helge
  • Nitsch, Volker
  • Lybek, Tonny

Abstract

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2008/5.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20085

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Keywords: Committee; council; governance; decision making; monetary policy;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Roman Horváth & Kateøina Šmídková & Jan Zápal & Marek Rusnák, 2012. "Dissent Voting Behavior of Central Bankers: What Do We Really Know?," Working Papers IES 2012/05, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Feb 2012.
  2. Florin Cornel DUMITER & Horatiu Florin SOIM, 2012. "Bank of England’s monetary policy committee – assessing the importance and the implication upon monetary policy," Anale. Seria Stiinte Economice. Timisoara, Faculty of Economics, Tibiscus University in Timisoara, vol. 0, pages 61-67, May.
  3. Weber, Anke, 2008. "Communication, decision-making and the optimal degree of transparency of monetary policy committees," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2008,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  4. Jan Marc Berk & Beata Bierut, 2009. "Communication in a monetary policy committee: a note," DNB Working Papers 226, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  5. Szilárd Erhart & Jose-Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy committee size: Theory and cross country evidence," MNB Working Papers 2007/6, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary).
  6. Marc-André Gosselin, 2007. "Central Bank Performance under Inflation Targeting," Working Papers 07-18, Bank of Canada.
  7. Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 180-187.
  8. Berdiev, Aziz N. & Kim, Yoonbai & Chang, Chun Ping, 2012. "The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 38-53.
  9. Badinger, Harald & Nitsch, Volker, 2014. "National representation in supranational institutions: The case of the European Central Bank," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-33.
  10. Berk, Jan Marc & Bierut, Beata K., 2011. "Communication in a monetary policy committee," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 791-801.
  11. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," KOF Working papers 08-195, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  12. Harald Badinger & Volker Nitsch, 2011. "National Representation in Multinational Institutions: The Case of the European Central Bank," CESifo Working Paper Series 3573, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. Attila Csajbók, 2008. "The use of staff policy recommendations in central banks," MNB Working Papers 2008/4, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary).

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