Monetary policy committee size and inflation volatility
AbstractPrevious research on the optimal size of a monetary policy committee (MPC) focused on theoretical analyses and experimental studies. These studies suggest that the ideal monetary policy committee may not have many more than five members. In this paper we conduct an empirical cross-country study to explore whether there is a link between the size of an MPC and inflation volatility. The analysis for 75 countries which have adopted MPCs provides some support for the above suggestion: countries with less than five MPC members tend to have larger deviations from trend inflation than MPCs with five members; raising the number of MPC members above five does not contribute to a further reduction in volatility.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Economics and Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 7 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=111059
Monetary policy committee; Inflation volatility; E31; E42; E58;
Other versions of this item:
- Szilárd Erhart & Harmen Lehment & Jose L. Vasquez Paz, 2007. "Monetary Policy Committee Size and Inflation Volatility," Kiel Working Papers 1377, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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