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Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making

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Author Info
Lombardelli, Clare
Proudman, James
Talbot, James
Abstract

We report the results of an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision making under uncertainty. A large sample of economics students played a simple monetary policy game, both as individuals and in committees of five players. Our findings - that groups make better decisions than individuals - accord with previous work by Blinder and Morgan. We also attempt to establish why this is so. Some of the improvement is related to the ability of committees to strip out the effect of bad play, but there is a significant additional improvement, which we associate with players learning from each other’s interest rate decisions.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 823.

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Date of creation: 08 Feb 2005
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Publication status: Published in International Journal of Central Banking Number 1.Volume 1(2005): pp. 181-205
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:823

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Keywords: Monetary policy experimental economics central banking uncertainty

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G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
G0 - Financial Economics - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Lars E.O. Svensson & Michael Woodford, 2000. "Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy," NBER Working Papers 7953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2000. "Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking," NBER Working Papers 7909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Fuhrer, Jeff & Moore, George, 1995. "Inflation Persistence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 127-59, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stephen Hansen & Michael F. McMahon, 2008. "Delayed Doves: MPC Voting Behaviour of Externals," CEP Discussion Papers dp0862, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2007. "Leadership in Groups: A Monetary Policy Experiment," NBER Working Papers 13391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Alan Blinder, 2006. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?," DNB Working Papers 092, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alan S. Blinder & Ricardo Reis, 2005. "Understanding the Greenspan standard," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 11-96. [Downloadable!]
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  7. John Duffy, 2008. "Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research," Working Papers 334, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2008. [Downloadable!]
  8. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Working papers 08-195, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
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