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Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?

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  • Berger, Helge
  • Nitsch, Volker
  • Lybek, Tonny

Abstract

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 24 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 817-832

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:4:p:817-832

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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Keywords: E52 E58 E61 Committee Council Governance Decision making Monetary policy;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker, 2008. "Too many cooks? Committees in monetary policy," Discussion Papers 2008/8, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  2. Jan Marc Berk & Beata Bierut, 2009. "Communication in a monetary policy committee: a note," DNB Working Papers 226, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  3. Anke Weber, 2010. "Communication, Decision making, and the Optimal Degree of Transparency of Monetary Policy Committees," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(3), pages 1-49, September.
  4. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central Bank boards around the world: why does membership size differ?," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  5. Harald Badinger & Volker Nitsch, 2011. "National Representation in Multinational Institutions: The Case of the European Central Bank," CESifo Working Paper Series 3573, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Szilárd Erhart & Jose-Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy committee size: Theory and cross country evidence," MNB Working Papers 2007/6, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary).
  7. Szilárd Erhart & Harmen Lehment & Jose L. Vasquez Paz, 2007. "Monetary Policy Committee Size and Inflation Volatility," Kiel Working Papers 1377, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  8. Szilárd Erhart & Jose Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2008. "Determinants of the size of a monetary policy committee: Theory and cross country evidence," Working Papers 2008-001, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
  9. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
  10. Roman Horváth & Kateøina Šmídková & Jan Zápal & Marek Rusnák, 2012. "Dissent Voting Behavior of Central Bankers: What Do We Really Know?," Working Papers IES 2012/05, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Feb 2012.
  11. Attila Csajbók, 2008. "The use of staff policy recommendations in central banks," MNB Working Papers 2008/4, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary).
  12. Marc-André Gosselin, 2007. "Central Bank Performance under Inflation Targeting," Working Papers 07-18, Bank of Canada.
  13. Berk, Jan Marc & Bierut, Beata K., 2011. "Communication in a monetary policy committee," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 791-801.

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