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The Role of the Chairman in Setting Monetary Policy: Individualistic vs. Autocratically Collegial MPCs

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Author Info
Petra Gerlach-Kristen (Swiss National Bank and University of Basel)
Abstract

This paper models the role of the Chairman in the decision making of individualistic and autocratically collegial monetary policy committees, assuming that uncertainty about the optimal interest rate causes policymakers’ views to differ and that they are unable to communicate their opinions perfectly. The Chairman’s ability to moderate the discussion and his economic skills—and, in an autocratically collegial committee, the authority arising from his position—impact the path of interest rates and the distribution of votes. Simulations suggest that his influence on the quality of policy itself is limited and that interest rate setting is only slightly worse in an autocratically collegial setup. The Chairman’s main impact is to help build consensus in the committee, which enhances the credibility of monetary policy.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by International Journal of Central Banking in its journal International Journal of Central Banking.

Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 119-143
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Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2008:q:3:a:5

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 3278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Weber, Anke, 2008. "Communication, decision-making and the optimal degree of transparency of monetary policy committees," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2008,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  3. Aksoy, Yunus & De Grauwe, Paul & Dewachter, Hans, 2002. "Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 443-469, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Belden, Susan, 1991. "The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes: Reply," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 429-32, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  6. Christopher Spencer, 2005. "Consensus Formation in Monetary Policy Committees," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 1505, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
  7. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2007. "How committees reduce the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers DULBEA 07-11.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
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  11. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 2007. "Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?," Peterson Institute Working Paper Series WP07-3, Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Watson, Mark W., 1986. "Univariate detrending methods with stochastic trends," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 49-75, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Chappell, Henry W, Jr & McGregor, Rob Roy & Vermilyea, Todd, 2004. "Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 407-22, June.
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  15. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  17. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2004. "Is the MPC's Voting Record Informative about Future UK Monetary Policy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(2), pages 299-313, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2005. "The Monetary Policy Committee and the Incentive Problem: A Selective Survey," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 23(S1), pages 37-82, October. [Downloadable!]
  19. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
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  22. Alan S. Blinder & Ricardo Reis, 2005. "Understanding the Greenspan standard," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 11-96. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1991. "The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(1), pages 130-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2006. " Taking Personalities out of Monetary Policy Decision Making? Interactions, Heterogeneity and Committee Decisions in the Bank of England’s MPC," CDMA Working Paper Series 0612, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.

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