This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Waller, Christopher J
Walsh, Carl E

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The authors parameterize central-bank independence in terms of partisanship and term length, focusing on the implications of alternative policy structures for real economic activity. While long terms of office for the central banker can reduce the role of electoral surprises, term lengths that are too long are costly if societal preferences are subject to permanent shifts. The appointment of a conservative central banker increases the optimal term length and leads to lower average inflation but need not increase the volatility of output. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199612%2986%3A5%3C1139%3ACIEBAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 86 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1139-53
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:5:p:1139-53

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Philip Schellekens, 2000. "Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy," Working Paper Series 25, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Johan Lagerlöf, 1998. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Know How the Economy Works?," CIG Working Papers FS IV 98-07, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised May 1999. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jan Libich & Petr Stehlik, 2007. "Incorporating Rigidity In The Timing Structure Of Macroeconomic Games," CAMA Working Papers 2007-10, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  4. Christopher J. Waller, 1998. "Appointing the median voter of a policy board," Working Paper 9802, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  5. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2005. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 5155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Xiang Lin, 1999. "Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 1056-1062, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bilin Neyaptý & Secil Ozgur, 1999. "The Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Discipline on Budgetary Outcomes : The Case of the European Union," Departmental Working Papers 996, Bilkent University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Brigitte Godbillon & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2001. "Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 163-179, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  12. Eric Le Borgne & Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2003. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," IMF Working Papers 03/144, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  13. Gauti Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2005. "The politics of central bank independence: a theory of pandering and learning in government," Staff Reports 205, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  14. Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2004. "How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Jan Libich, 2006. "An Explicit Inflation Target As A Commitment Device," CAMA Working Papers 2006-22, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2008-4-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.