Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union
AbstractWe examine whether the central bank council of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare if the private benefits of holding office are sufficiently low. High private benefits of central bankers lower overall welfare under opacity, as they induce European central bankers to care more about being re-appointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. We show that opacity and low private benefits jointly guarantee the optimal welfare level. Moreover, we suggest that non-renewable terms for national central bankers and delegating the appointment of all council members to a European agency would be desirable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5155.
Date of creation: Jul 2005
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-08-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2005-08-13 (Central Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2005-08-13 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-MAC-2005-08-13 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2005-08-13 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-08-13 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SEA-2005-08-13 (South East Asia)
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