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Monetary Policy Committees - meetings and outcomes

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Author Info
Jan Marc Berk () (De Nederlandsche Bank, Statistics & Information Division, PO Box 98, 1000AB Amsterdam, the Netherlands.)
Beata K. Bierut () (De Nederlandsche Bank, Economics & Research Division, PO Box 98, 1000AB Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

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Abstract

Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre-repared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke. JEL Classification: E58, D71, D78.

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Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 1070.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20091070

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Related research
Keywords: monetary policy committee; voting; Bank of England; Federal Open Market Committee.;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: Cited by:
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  1. Campbell Leith & Ioana Moldovan & Raffaele Rossi, 2009. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Habits in Consumption," Working Paper Series 1076, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Giacomo Carboni & Martin Ellison, 2009. "Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information," Working Paper Series 1092, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.

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