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Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee

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Author Info
Henry W. Chappell, Jr. () (University of South Carolina)
Rob Roy McGregor () (University of North Carolina, Charlotte)
Todd A. Vermilyea (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices. To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.

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Publisher Info
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This book is provided by The MIT Press in its series MIT Press Books with number 0262033305 and published in 2005.

Volume: 1
Edition: 1
ISBN: 0-262-03330-5
Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262033305

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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jake Furbush).

Related research
Keywords: monetary policy; open market; inflation; alan greenspan; federal open market committee;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," DNB Working Papers 170, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "On the Optimality of Decisions made by Hub-and-Spokes Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 027, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  4. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2007. "How committees reduce the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers DULBEA 07-11.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2005. "Communication and decision-making by central bank committees - different strategies, same effectiveness?," Working Paper Series 488, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Petra Geraats, 2007. "Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  8. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Rob McGregor, 2007. "Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 269-273, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Brian Snowdon, 2007. "The New Classical Counter-Revolution: False Path or Illuminating Complement?," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 541-562, Fall. [Downloadable!]
  11. Christopher A. Sims & Tao Zha, 2006. "Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 54-81, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Hein Roelfsema, 2006. "Why are federal central banks more activist?," Working Papers 06-06, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Job Swank & Otto Swank & Bauke Visser, 2006. "Transparency and Pre-meetings," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-051/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  14. Thomas Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2006. "Shocks and Government Beliefs: The Rise and Fall of American Inflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1193-1224, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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