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The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control

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  • R. Emre Aytimur
  • Aristotelis Boukouras
  • Robert Schwager

Abstract

We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates’ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters’ ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2012/wp-cesifo-2012-07/cesifo1_wp3900.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3900.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3900

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Related research

Keywords: elections; polarization; strategic delegation; bureaucracy; foreign influence;

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  1. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2011. "Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 83-104, January.
  2. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
  3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
  5. John E. Roemer, 2004. "Indeterminacy of Citizen-candidate Equilibrium," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm350, Yale School of Management.
  6. Jennings, Colin & Roelfsema, Hein, 2008. "Civil conflict, federalism and strategic delegation of leadership," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-16, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  7. Christopher Chambers, 2007. "Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 285-309, November.
  8. Hamlin, Alan & Hjortlund, Michael, 2000. " Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 205-30, June.
  9. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2001. "Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 67-82, January.
  10. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
  11. Roelfsema, Hein, 2007. "Strategic delegation of environmental policy making," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 270-275, March.
  12. Fatum, Rasmus, 2006. "One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 659-669, May.
  13. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September.
  14. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2002. " Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-84.
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