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The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control

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  • R. Emre Aytimur
  • Aristotelis Boukouras
  • Robert Schwager

Abstract

We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates’ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters’ ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2012/wp-cesifo-2012-07/cesifo1_wp3900.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3900.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3900

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Keywords: elections; polarization; strategic delegation; bureaucracy; foreign influence;

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  1. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
  2. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
  3. Hamlin, Alan & Hjortlund, Michael, 2000. " Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 205-30, June.
  4. John E. Roemer, 2003. "Indeterminacy of Citizen-Candidate Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1410, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701, October.
  6. Christopher Chambers, 2007. "Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 285-309, November.
  7. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2008. "Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen-Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties," CEDI Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University 08-11, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  8. H.J. Roelfsema, 2004. "Strategic Delegation of Environmental Policy Making," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics 04-11, Utrecht School of Economics.
  9. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2001. "Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 67-82, January.
  10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September.
  11. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2002. " Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-84.
  12. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Working Papers, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics 0803, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
  13. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
  14. Jennings, Colin & Roelfsema, Hein, 2008. "Civil conflict, federalism and strategic delegation of leadership," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2008-16, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  15. Fatum, Rasmus, 2006. "One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 659-669, May.
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