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Tax Incidence, Majority Voting And Capital Market Integration

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Author Info
Lockwood, Ben (Department of Economics and CSGR)
Makris, Miltiadis (Department of Economics, University of Exeter, CMPO, University of Bristol and IMOP, Athens University of Economics and Business)

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Abstract

We re-examine, from a political economy perspective, the standard view that higher capital mobility results in lower capital taxes - a view, in fact, that is not confirmed by the available empirical evidence. We show that when a small economy is opened to capital mobility, the change of incidence of a tax on capital - from capital owners to owners of the immobile factor - may interact in such a way with political decision-making so as to cause a rise in the equilibrium tax. This can happen whether or not the fixed factor (labour) can be taxed.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/twerp712.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 712.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:712

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kessler, Anke S. & Lulfesmann, Christoph & Myers, Gordon M., 2003. "Economic versus political symmetry and the welfare concern with market integration and tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 847-865, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1991. "International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax Harmonization," NBER Working Papers 3152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Lisa Grazzini & Tanguy Van Ypersele, 2003. "Fiscal Coordination and Political Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 305-325, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 1997. "Capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 149-165, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Wilson, John Douglas, 1987. "Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(4), pages 835-56, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. DePeter James A. & Myers Gordon M., 1994. "Strategic Capital Tax Competition: A Pecuniary Externality and a Corrective Device," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 66-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Gordon, Roger H, 1986. "Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1086-1102, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Noiset Luc, 1995. "Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods: Comment," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 312-316, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Wooders, Myrna & Zissimos, Ben & Dhillon, Amrita, 2001. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 622, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  15. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Kessler, Anke S & Lulfesmann, Christoph & Myers, Gordon M, 2002. "Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(4), pages 899-923, October.
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  1. Ben Zissimos & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition," Working Papers 0710, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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