Fiscal Coordination and Political Competition
AbstractThis contribution investigates fiscal coordination in the framework of two countries asymmetric in respect of their capital-labor endowment. When tax policies are decided by majority voting inside each country, and they are not coordinated at a supranational level, factors of production are inefficiently allocated, at equilibrium. Our main result shows that fiscal coordination, via a minimum capital tax, does not always lead to a Pareto-improvement for the median voter's welfare, with respect to the noncooperative outcome. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 5 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
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