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Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition

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  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Schjelderup, Guttorm

Abstract

This paper studies whether a group of countries can gain from harmonizing their capital income taxes if the rest of the world does not follow suit. It is shown that cooperation among the subgroup of countries is beneficial if tax rates in the initial fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium are strategic complements. In this case tax harmonization among a subset of countries is Pareto improving for all countries.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Urban Economics.

Volume (Year): 46 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 156-167

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Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:46:y:1999:i:1:p:156-167

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905

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  1. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
  2. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
  3. KEEN, Michael & MARCHAND, Maurice, 1996. "Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1996001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
  5. DePeter James A. & Myers Gordon M., 1994. "Strategic Capital Tax Competition: A Pecuniary Externality and a Corrective Device," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 66-78, July.
  6. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
  7. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
  8. Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W, 1991. "Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 658-65, June.
  9. Baye, Michael R & Crocker, Keith J & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization, Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 223-36, March.
  10. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 489-504, May.
  11. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November.
  12. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  13. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  14. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
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