Information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal-taxation framework. We introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital-income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier literature that integration of international caopital markets may lead to the under-provision of publicly provided goods. However, in contrast to previous results in the literature, under-provision occurs due to inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public-good provision as well as complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics", 2002 .
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