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Tax Competition for International Producers and the Mode of Foreign Market Entry

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  • Ronald B. Davies

    ()
    (University of Oregon Economics Department)

  • Hartmut Egger

    ()
    (University of Zurich, CESifo Munich, and Centre for Globalization and Economic Policy, University of Nottingham)

  • Peter Egger

    ()
    (-Maximilian University of Munich, CESifo Munich, and Centre for Globalization and Economic Policy, University of Nottingham)

Abstract

This paper studies non-cooperative tax competition between two countries for an international producer. The international producer chooses where to locate its headquarters and whether to serve the overseas market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that, in the absence of tax competition, the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can use its tax rate to enforce exporting instead of FDI, thereby leading to a Nash equilibrium in the tax setting game which is associated with higher world welfare than the no-tax situation. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2006-19.

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Length: 40
Date of creation: 10 Apr 2003
Date of revision: 10 Jun 2003
Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2006-19

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Related research

Keywords: Tax competition; Multinational enterprises; Profit taxation; Double taxation relief;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Egger & Wolfgang Eggert & Hannes Winner, 2007. "Saving Taxes Through Foreign Plant Ownership," CESifo Working Paper Series 1887, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Nils Herger & Christos Kotsogiannis & Steve McCorriston, 2011. "International Taxation and FDI Strategies: Evidence From US Cross-Border Acquisitions," Discussion Papers 1109, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  3. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Arusha Cooray, 2012. "What Drives FDI Policy Liberalization? An Empirical Investigation," CAMA Working Papers 2012-27, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

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