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The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals

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  • Thomas A. Gresik

Abstract

Financial and real investment flexibility, tax competition, and superior economic information by transnationals both create a rationale for corporate income taxation and limit the effectiveness of such taxation. While these factors have led to a variety of transnational tax policies, such as deferral, double taxation, apportionment, and trade rules, very few of these institutional features have been integrated into tax competition and agency models. In this paper, I show how the integration of investment flexibility, tax competition, and agency issues is crucial to our understanding of corporate tax policies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.

Volume (Year): 39 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 800-838

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:39:y:2001:i:3:p:800-838

Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.39.3.800
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