Transfer Pricing, Double Taxation, and the Cost of Capital
AbstractThe effects of double taxation are analyzed when a multinational enterprise can shift profits by transfer pricing behavior. It is shown that the well-known Hartman-Sinn neutrality result may not hold in this case. Surprisingly, an increase in the taxation of foreign dividends may lead to a lower cost of capital for the foreign subsidiary. Copyright 1996 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 98 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
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