Strategic Behavior And The Rules For International Taxation Of Capital
AbstractThis paper examines the welfare of a capital exporting or source country and a capital importing or host country under tax credit and tax deduction systems for the international taxation of capital. Because the two tax systems may create quite different strategic incentives for the countries, the authors compare the equilibria in the tax-setting game played by the two countries under each system. They find that the tax credits system introduces an antitrade bias into the equilibrium, contrary to initial impressions, and that both capital exporting and capital importing countries will prefer the tax-deductions scheme to tax credits. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 3-88-10.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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behaviour ; capital tax ; international market ; social welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- Bond, Eric W & Samuelson, Larry, 1989. "Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 1099-1111, December.
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