Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 46 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
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