The Role of Negotiators in Union-Firm Bargaining
AbstractDifferences between the objectives of union leaders and those of the rank and file have traditionally been thought the result of political processes or irrationality. This paper shows that such differences will naturally arise as part of a rational bargaining strategy, since delegation of authority to a negotiator permits the union members to achieve advantageous commitment. This use of negotiators leads to revised interpretation of many popular theories of wage and employment determination, such as the efficient bargain and the right-to-manage models, and has implications for the interpretation of econometric modeling of union behavior.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 22 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ana, MAULEON & Huasheng, SONG & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2006.
"Networks for Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques)
2006029, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Ana Mauleon & Huasheng Song & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2010. "Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 471-500, 06.
- MAULEON, Ana & SONG, Huasheng & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, . "Networks of free trade agreements among heterogeneous countries," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2200, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MAULEON, Ana & SONG, Huasheng & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2006. "Networks of free trade agreements among heterogeneous countries," CORE Discussion Papers 2006053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2005.
"Strategic union delegation and strike activity,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 149-173, February.
- Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2002. "Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, . "Strategic union delegation and strike activity," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1766, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gaston, N., 2000. "Unions and the Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining in a Globalising World," ISER Discussion Paper 0495, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Eckert, Heather, 2003. "Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-24, July.
- Persyn, Damiaan, 2013. "Union wage demands with footloose firms and agglomeration forces," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 142-150.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.