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Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment

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Author Info
Schotter, Andrew
Snyder, Blaine
Zheng, Wei

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Abstract

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9386/RR95-27.pdf
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 95-27.

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Length: 68 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:95-27

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Related research
Keywords: Bargaining; delegation; commitment;

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Cited by:
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  1. Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, . "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, 2008. "Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility," IEW - Working Papers iewwp380, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-21.

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