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Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information

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Author Info
Leininger, W.
Linhart, P. B.
Radner, R.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 48 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 63-106
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:63-106

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  1. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004. "What to Maximize if You Must," Discussion Papers 1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ohad Kadan, 2004. "Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliate Private Values," Working Papers 2004.12, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  3. James E. Parco, 2006. "Price-setting power and information asymmetry in sealed bidding," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(6), pages 413-434. [Downloadable!]
  4. Yannick Gabuthy, 2004. "Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 353-371, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsati & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," ESE Discussion Papers 75, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2004. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0401, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  7. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsat?Author-Name: Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 502.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  8. Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2003. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00178587_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  9. d ASPREMONT, Claude & CRƒMER, Jacques & GƒRARD-VARET, Louis-AndrŽ, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," CORE Discussion Papers 2003045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet & Nadège Marchand, 2008. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00259453_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Artyom Shneyerov & Adam Chi Leung Won, 2008. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1467, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. HEIFETZ, Aviad & SHANNON, Chris & SPIEGEL, Yossi, 2003. "What to maximize if you must," CORE Discussion Papers 2003047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  13. Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2004. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Experimental 0402002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2005. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Discussion Papers 1415, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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