Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination
AbstractIn this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single- and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policy-maker's reputation for sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and a conscious rational private sector and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject. This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open economy macroeconomics and to professional economists interested in using macroeconomic models to design policy.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521104609 and published in 2009.
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Other versions of this item:
- Currie,David & Levine,Paul, 1993. "Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521441964, April.
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