Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains
AbstractThe design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization. Hence, it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices. A precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players'expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one's own favor (Schelling (1960)). How these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 9617.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 12 (4), September 1998, pp. 333-359
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Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.05
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
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vertical restraints; vertical separation; contract theory;
Other versions of this item:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
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