This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Gersbach, Hans
Liessem, Verena

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency. The incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self-financing across terms.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-4SRKMCX-2/2/55910efc4a8a1603274b1beba3e318cc
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 68 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 401-411
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:68:y:2008:i:2:p:401-411

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords: Elections Incentive contracts Multi-task problems;

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Markus Müller, 2007. "Motivation of politicians and long-term policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 273-289, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gersbach, Hans, 2004. "Competition of Politicians for Wages and Office," CEPR Discussion Papers 4261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Gersbach, Hans, 2008. "Contractual Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6763, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008. "Reelection threshold contracts in politics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Hans Gersbach, 2001. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 210000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.