Towards measurement of political pressure on central banks: the case of the central bank of egypt
AbstractThis paper assesses whether the legal independence granted to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) by the latest legislation promulgated in 2005 is factual. The author followed Fry's methodology, which assumes that the level of independence of the central bank is determined by fiscal attributes. In an attempt to develop Fry's method, there was used a simple criterion to assess the central bank's independence, namely, that the central bank is actually independent if it can fulfill its money supply target without squeezing the private sector. Applying this criterion to the case of the CBE, we find that the legal independence granted to the CBE by the latest legislation is not factual.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Prague Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 2008 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Postal: Editorial office Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3, Czech Republic
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
- E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
- H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bernard Laurens & Marco Arnone & Jean-FranÃ§ois Segalotto, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy: Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund.
- Jean-FranÃ§ois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Papers 06/228, International Monetary Fund.
- Maier, Philipp & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2002. "Political pressure on the Bundesbank: an empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 103-123, March.
- Ibrahim L. AWAD, 2008. "Is Egypt Ready to Apply Inflation Targeting Regime?," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 2, pages 141-159, November.
- Ibrahim L. Awad, 2010. "Why Has the Central Bank of Egypt Been Unable to Achieve The Goal of Price Stability Under the Economic Reform Program?," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(6), pages 27-48.
- Ibrahim L. Awad, 2009. "Did Egypt Satisfy Prerequisites for an it Regime?," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2009(6), pages 63-80.
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